A debate is going on in the professional forums on whether the appellate authorities i.e., First Appellate Authority (FAA) or the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal (“GSTAT”), being the creature of statute, have power to condone the delay beyond the condonable period prescribed in the statute. Section 107(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 (“Act”) requires a first appeal to be filed within three months of communication of the order. Section 107(4) of the Act permits the FAA to admit a belated appeal for ‘a further period of one month’ upon sufficient cause is shown. Section 112(1) of the Act requires an appeal to the GSTAT to be filed within three months of FAA order or Revisional Authority order. Section 112(6) of the Act permits GSTAT to admit a belated appeal (or cross-objection, subject to its own 45-day rule) within a further period of three months.
The FAA across India has rejected the appeals filed beyond the condonable period and the said orders are appealable before the GSTAT. Now, the taxpayers have filed the appeals before GSTAT for examining whether the GSTAT can condone the delay in filing the 1st appeal beyond the condonable period prescribed in the statute. Recently, the Principal Bench of GSTAT constituted a Special Bench to determine whether the First Appellate Authority has the authority to condone the delay beyond the statutory time limit.
This is not a new question. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has answered this question repeatedly since 2007 under the Central Excise, Customs and VAT laws, and, very recently, under the Companies Act as well. Yet every time a new fiscal statute comes along, the same question gets litigated afresh. This article explains the judicial precedents from the Central Excise, through VAT, into the Companies Act and applies it to below practical questions that every GST practitioner is facing today -
- Whether the FAA and GSTAT can condone delays beyond what the statute permits;
- Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act [“Act, 1963”] can rescue an appeal filed beyond the condonable period;
- The position of the High Court and Supreme Court as GST appellate forums;
- How far can a Writ Court condone the delay once the statutory door has closed?
With the above questions, let us understand the statutory framework under Section 5 and 29(2) of the Act, 1963 first. Section 5 of the Act, 1963 reads as follows -
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. – Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”
From the above, we can identify that there are two important aspects. First, this power is given to a ‘court’ and not to every forum that decides disputes. Second, Section 5 of the Act, 1963 applies only to proceedings under general law (principally the Code of Civil Procedure). Its extension to a ‘special or local law’ such as a tax statute happens only through Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963, which reads as follows -
“29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
Reading the two provisions together brings up the below two questions -
- First, does Section 5 of the Act, 1963 apply to other than a court? (which is the point GST practitioners tend to overlook i.e., Section 5 applies only before a ‘court’)
- Second, does the special law (Central Excise Act, VAT enactment, Companies Act or CGST Act), read as a whole, show an intention to keep Section 5 of the Act, 1963 out of its ambit?
A quasi-judicial authority or tribunal created by a tax statute is ordinarily not a ‘court’, so the gateway under Limitation Act will not be available unless the special law specifically gives the power to condone delay. It is this first and more fundamental point which was recently and emphatically restated by the Apex Court in the company law context in case of The Property Company (P) Ltd. v. Rohinten Daddy Mazda[1] (hereinafter referred as ‘Property Company’), which this article places at the Centre of the GST analysis, ahead of the more familiar ‘complete code’ debate.
Before proceeding further, let us understand the position under Central Excise, Service Tax, Customs and VAT context. In Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur[2], the Apex Court examined the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which provides 60 days’ time limit to file an appeal with additional condonation period by a further 30 days. The Court held that the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, being creatures of statute, cannot condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed in the statute. A specific 30 day upper cap shows a clear intent to exclude Section 5 of the Act, 1963. There was no law declared by Supreme Court that even though the Statute prescribed a particular period of limitation, this Court can direct condonation. That would render a specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose.
A year later, in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd.[3], a three-judge Bench went a step further. The provision in question is the unamended Section 35H of the Central Excise Act, 1944 governing reference applications to the High Court which prescribed 180 days with no condonable extension at all. The Court held that the Sections of the same Chapter i.e., Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G expressly grants a condonable extension but not in Section 35H and this silence itself is an indicator of exclusion and it binds even the High Court under Section 5 of the Act, 1963.
In VAT context, the Apex Court in case of Patel Brothers v. State of Assam[4], examined that Section 81 of the Assam VAT Act, 2003 which provides 60 days period for revision before the High Court, while Section 84 of the same Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Act, 1963 applicable to such proceedings. It was held that this selective adoption was itself a clear act of exclusion. If the Legislature wanted Section 5 to apply, it would have specified it exactly as it did elsewhere in the same Act (Sections 79 and 80, which gave the FAA and Tribunal forums an express further condonable period). The High Court, therefore, had no power to condone a 335-day delay.
Two years later, on almost identical facts under a sister enactment, the Apex Court reached the opposite result. In Superintending Engineer, Dehar Powerhouse Circle v. Excise & Taxation Officer[5], it was held that Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005 provides 90 days period for a revision and it was silent altogether regarding the Act, 1963. The Court distinguished Patel Brothers on precisely this ground and held that Section 5 stood attracted. Read together, the two cases show there is no standard rule that ‘tax statutes exclude Section 5’ or the reverse and each statute has to be read on its own text.
Later, the Apex Court in case of Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd.[6], while examining the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act has held that once the statutory appeal remedy has been foreclosed by limitation, a Writ Court should exercise self-restraint rather than routinely reviving it, doing so would make the limitation scheme meaningless.
Now, coming to Companies Act context, it is pertinent to examine the recent decision of the two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in case of ‘Property Company’, wherein it examined a similar question. Although the decision is in the context of Companies Act, it has laid down the principles which are equally applicable for every quasi-judicial GST forum, including GSTAT. In this case, the respondent sought registration of shares inherited under a will, more than two decades after probate, and approached the Company Law Board (“CLB”) under Section 58(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 with a delay of 249 days. The CLB condoned the delay, citing the respondent’s residence abroad and confusion during the transition from the 1956 Act and this decision was affirmed by the Calcutta High Court. Later, the Apex Court set aside both the orders and held that the CLB had no power to condone the delay, for two reasons as follows -
- First, the Act, 1963 including Section 5 applies only to proceedings before ‘court’. A quasi-judicial body being a creature of statute does not automatically acquire that character. It must actually be shown to be a court.
- Second, Section 433 of the Companies Act (which expressly gives the NCLT and NCLAT the power to apply the Act, 1963) cannot be read backwards to give the same power to the CLB, an earlier and different body, merely because both perform similar functions. The Court put it plainly -
“…the provisions of the Act, 1963…would only apply to suits, applications or appeals which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard… The absence of express exclusion, by itself, cannot be said to have conferred the CLB with the power to condone delay.”
This reframes the debate for GST. Most common question that is being asked based on Singh Enterprises is whether Section 107 (or 112) of the Act impliedly excluded Section 5 of the Act, 1963? The Property Company insists on a prior question i.e., is the Appellate Authority, or GSTAT, a ‘court’ at all, so that Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963 even opens the gate to Section 5 in the first place? On this footing, the ‘implied exclusion’ debate becomes almost academic and the power to condone delay has to be found within Sections 107 and 112 of the Act themselves, because neither provision has stated that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 is applicable.
Coming to GST context, many High Courts held that Sections 107 of the Act is complete codes that impliedly exclude Section 5 of the Act, 1963 beyond these ceilings relying on Singh Enterprises and Hongo India. Few of the decisions under GST include Penuel Excus (P) Ltd v. Additional Commissioner (Appeals)[7], Garg Enterprises v. State of U.P.[8], Abhishek Trading Corp. v. State of U.P.[9], Nandan Steels & Power Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh[10] and Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti v. State of A.P.[11], wherein it was held that CGST Act a self-contained code excluding Section 5 of the Act, 1963.
Against this, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & Sons v. UOI[12] has held that since provisions of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 have not been expressly or impliedly excluded by Section 107 of the Act of 2017, by virtue of Section 29 (2) of the Act of 1963, Section 5 of the Act of 1963 stands attracted and the FAA can condone delay beyond the four-month ceiling on sufficient cause. This has been followed in later Calcutta decisions in case of Arvind Gupta v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue[13]; Partha Pratim Dasgupta v. Joint Commissioner of State Tax and Ors[14].
However, the High Courts in case of Yadav Steels v. Commissioner[15] and Addichem Speciality LLP v. Special Commissioner-I, Delhi GST[16] refused to condone delay beyond 4 months, holding that Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot extend the maximum condonable period provided under Section 107 of the Act, relying on Singh Enterprises, Hongo India and Glaxo Smith Kline and distinguishing ‘S.K. Chakraborty’. Also, the decisions of Calcutta High Court do not survive The Property Company test as the Appellate Authority cannot be considered as a ‘court’ for the purposes of Section 29(2) of the Act, 1963.
In view of the above analysis and discussion, the answers to the questions framed are as follows -
(a) Whether GSTAT and the FAA can condone delays beyond the condonable period?
No, the FAA and GSTAT are both creatures of statute and cannot condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed under the statute.
(b) Whether Section 5 of the Act, 1963 can rescue a belated appeal?
No, considering the above-referred judicial decisions. Until the Supreme Court resolves the conflict directly in the GST context, practitioners outside West Bengal should proceed on the footing that Section 5 offers no rescue beyond the statutory ceilings.
(c) The position of the High Court and Supreme Court as GST appellate forums ?
Yes, because of the ‘court’ distinction in The Property Company. Section 117 (appeal to the High Court on a substantial question of law from a GSTAT order) prescribes 180 days and Section 117(3), expressly applies the Code of Civil Procedure’s appellate provisions consequent to which Section 5 of the Act, 1963 will come into picture as the High Court is unquestionably a court. Section 118 (appeal to the Supreme Court) attracts the CPC similarly.
(d) How far can a Writ Court condone the delay once the statutory door has closed?
Two separate questions here. First, where GSTAT rejects an appeal as filed beyond the condonable period provided under Section 112(6) of the Act, a further appeal under Section 117 of the Act lies only on a ‘substantial question of law’. Whether GSTAT correctly applied its own statutory ceiling is ordinarily not such a question and it is settled law applied to undisputed facts, so the High Court would ordinarily decline to re-open it, except where GSTAT itself misapplied the ceiling (say, miscalculated the date of communication).
Second, and more commonly litigated, is where a taxpayer approaches the jurisdictional High Court directly under Article 226, seeking either to compel condonation or to have the underlying order quashed. This power comes not from Section 5 of the Act, 1963 at all, but from the extraordinary, equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 (and, over subordinate tribunals, Article 227), which exists independently of any taxing statute’s limitation scheme. But the Apex Court has repeatedly cautioned against treating independence as a license, the governing principle, most clearly stated in ‘Glaxo Smith Kline’, is self-restraint, a Writ Court should not routinely use Article 226 to overcome the statutory framework. However, the restraint is not absolute. Writ jurisdiction survives on narrower, jurisdictional or constitutional grounds that are not really Section 5 discretion in disguise -
- Violation of Natural justice: Where the appeal was rejected solely on delay without providing effective opportunity of being heard to explain the reasons for delay.
- Want of jurisdiction or a fundamental-rights violation: Where the original order is wholly without jurisdiction or offends Article 14/19/21, a time-barred appellate remedy does not oust writ jurisdiction over such an order, a position recognized even in Singh Enterprises.
- Non-communication or defective communication: Where limitations never validly began to run because the order was not properly served. Here the writ jurisdiction holds that no delay occurred in law, rather than condoning one.
- Gross, demonstrable hardship, exercised sparingly: The writ jurisdiction is not per se barred merely because a statutory remedy is time-barred, though it remains extraordinary and sparingly used.
The source of the Writ Court’s power is constitutional, not statutory, and its extent is deliberately narrow as explained above but not as a routine substitute for a missed statutory condonation window.
Concluding remarks
A two decade of near-identical litigation across Central Excise, Customs, VAT, Companies Act and now GST forums suggest the problem is structural, not merely a matter of interpretation. Decision of The Property Company, though decided far from GST, gives more clarity to the practitioners as against the ‘complete code’ test alone. However, the Parliament (or the GST Council) should consider whether the current law position serves any real purpose. Express provision clarifying exactly how far the Act, 1963 applies to the Appellate Authority, Revisional Authority and GSTAT would also help the taxpayers to be more vigilant. Also, a large share of the condonation litigation is due to disputes on dates of communication, therefore, the cross-verification by SMS and e-mail (as GSTAT’s own portal already partly does) for all communications, would resolve a good fraction of these disputes before they even reach a condonation application.
Disclaimer: This article is intended for general professional guidance and academic discussion. It does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to examine the full text of the judgments cited and to seek independent professional advice before acting on the views expressed herein. For any queries or feedback please write to [email protected] or [email protected].
[1] Civil Appeal No.92 of 2026 (Arising out of S.L.P (Civil) No. 3906 of 2017)
[2] (2008) 221 ELT 163 (SC)
[3] (2009) 236 ELT 417 (SC)
[4] (2017) 345 ELT 578 (SC)
[5] 2019 (30) GSTL 193 (SC)]
[6] 2020 (36) G.S.T.L. 305 (S.C.)
[7] 2023 (75) GSTL 582 (Kerala)
[8] 2024 (15) Centax 510 (All)
[9] 2024 (16) Centax 179 (All)
[10] 2023 (6) Centax 301 (Chhattisgarh)
[11] 2024 (23) Centax 43 (AP)
[12] 2024 (15) Centax 172 (Cal)
[13] (2024) 14 Centax 295 (Cal.)
[14] (2024) 19 Centax 357 (Cal)
[15] 2024 (19) CENTAX 435 (All)
[16] (2025) 27 Centax 145 (Del.)